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1. Background and Introduction 
Integrated water resources management (IWRM) and organizing it primarily at the river 
basin level are two of the most common and widely repeated recommendations in the 
water resources literature of the last decade if not longer (Allee 1988; Galloway 1997; 
McDonald and Kay 1988; World Bank 1993).  Basin management is often associated 
with the concept of decentralization, of managing water resources at the “lowest 
appropriate level.” (See, e.g., International Conference on Water and the Environment 
1992; Mody 2001.)  Several conceptual arguments have been presented in favor of 
decentralization in water resource management, and basin-level management in 
particular, including that the whole array of resources and use patterns in the basin will be 
taken into account, management decisions will be based on better knowledge of local 
conditions, and incentives for stakeholders to actively participate in management will be 
stronger. 
  Empirical studies of river basin management systems provide opportunities to 
examine the claims made for basin-level integrated resources management, and to 
explore factors that appear to influence its implementation and outcomes.  In this research 
project the project team has searched for those factors and their relationships to river 
basin management in two ways: with a survey of river basin organizations throughout the 
world, and with case studies of eight river basins analyzed in greater detail.  Some of 
those eight cases have long histories of basin-scale institutions for water resource 
management, such as the Guadalquivir river basin in Spain and the Murray-Darling river 
basin in Australia.  Others have emerged recently, as in the Warta river basin in Poland, 
where the Polish government established regional water management authorities over the 
past 15 years. 
This case has been extremely valuable because the formation of the river basin 
authorities in Poland was a central government initiative that occurred in the fairly recent 
memory of many individuals who are still actively involved in water and government, 
and whose perspectives on the origin, growth, and recent difficulties of the basin 
management effort are both fresh and rich.  The Warta basin therefore provided an 
opportunity to explore a decentralization reform that included the creation of river basin 
organizations. 
This paper focuses on analysis of the establishment of the river basin 
organizations in Poland, the extent of their integration or coordination with other 
governmental bodies that have water-related responsibilities, and the impact of reforms to 
Polish water law.  More detailed information about the river basin, the history of Polish 
water management, and the structure of government in Poland may be found in the 
background paper by Tonderski and Blomquist (2003). 
 
2. Analytical Framework 
To analyze the data gathered for this project from the case studies and from the survey of 
river basin organizations, the project team has developed a framework that identifies a 
number of political and institutional factors which may be associated with the emergence, 
sustainability, and success or failure of decentralized approaches to IWRM at the basin 
scale.  These factors, and their hypothesized relationships with basin management in a 
country that has decentralized or is attempting to decentralize water resource 
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management institutions, are derived from the institutional analysis literature relating to 
water or other natural resource management and to decentralized systems (especially 
Ostrom 1990, 1992; also Agrawal 2000; Alaerts 1999; Blomquist and Schlager 1999; 
Bromley 1999; Easter and Hearne 1993; Wunsch 1991). 
Our information gathering and analysis focuses on the following sets of variables. 
 
 Contextual factors and initial conditions 
 Characteristics of the decentralization process 
 Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and 
capacities 
 The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements 
 Motivation of stakeholders 
 
Variables considered within each set are listed in the appendix.  The Warta Basin 
case is discussed in terms of these categories and variables in Section 8. 
 
3. Methodology 
A case study approach was pursued for this project in order to examine closely the 
processes of institutional change as well as the current situation.   An expert in 
environmental policy facilitated the site visit, arranging interviews and preparing a 
background paper on the basin prior to the visit (Tonderski and Blomquist 2003).  
Background papers for all case study visits are based on a common outline.  During the 
site visit, team members met with and interviewed 14 individuals, including central and 
local government officials, staff of the river basin authority, and academic researchers 
with perspectives on governmental structure and water management in Poland.2  The 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with a view to understanding the processes of 
institutional origin and change within the Warta basin, the incentives of different 
stakeholders related to such change, and the performance of water management 
institutions at sub-basin, basin, and national scales, matters that were closely within the 
knowledge of the interviewees.  After the visit, team members combined their notes from 
the interviews, revisited and revised the basin background paper, reviewed other 
materials, and composed this summary and analysis.3 
  The following analysis of the Warta basin case is therefore based on a 
combination of sources—documentary materials on Poland and the Warta basin, the 
background paper prepared for the visit, and the interviews conducted during the site 
visit.  The findings and conclusions therefore do not represent the point of view of a 
single individual or organization, but emerge from a composite of data collected and 
reviewed by the research project team. 
                                                 
2 Organizations from which individuals were interviewed included the Polish Bureau of Water 
Management, the State Council of Water Management, the Regional Water Management Authority in 
Poznań and in a local office in Skeczniew, the Department of Environmental Protection and Agriculture of 
the Voivodeship of Wielkepolski, the Wielkepolski Voivodeship Fund for Environmental Protection, the 
Poviat of Poznań, the Municipality of Poznań, the Poznań Water Utility, the Municipality of Tarnowo 
Podgorne, and the Tarnowo Podgorne Inspectorate of Environmental Protection.  
3 A review and extensive comments on an earlier draft of this paper were provided by Krystian Piechowiak, 
and are greatly appreciated. 
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4. Water Management Issues and Stakeholders in the Warta River Basin 
4.1 Physical Characteristics of the Basin 
The Warta River4, in western Poland, is the largest tributary of the Oder, which forms 
part of the boundary between Poland and Germany.  The Warta is Poland’s third largest 
river after the Oder and the Vistula.  The river flows north from its headwaters in the 
mountains of southern Poland, then west to the Oder, and is 808.2 km in length with 
approximately 735 km navigable.  Major tributaries of the Warta include the Noteć 
(388.4km long), Prosna (216.8km), Drawa (185.9km), Obra (163.8km), Gwda 
(145.1km), Ner (125.9km), and Wełna (117.8km) rivers. 
The Warta River basin’s 55,193 km2 area covers approximately one-sixth of 
Poland.  The basin is divisible into three major sub-basins: the Upper Warta sub-basin 
(including the Prosna River watershed) which covers about 20,825.6 km2; the Middle and 
Lower Warta sub-basin (to the river mouth at the confluence with the Oder) which covers 
about 17,033.5 km2; and the Upper and Lower Noteć sub-basin which covers 17.333,9 
km2. 
In addition to the streams and rivers, the basin contains numerous lakes and 
reservoirs.  Small reservoirs are used for agricultural purposes, while larger ones in the 
upper sub-basin and on the major tributaries provide flood protection and water storage 
for recreation and for industry. 
Land use in the basin is 70% agriculture and forestry, 30% urban and industrial.  
The basin’s population is about 6,770,000, over 34% of which live in cities.  By far the 
largest city in the region is Poznań, the capital city of Wielkopolska Voivodeship5, with a 
population of approximately 600,000.  Within Poznań’s boundaries alone the river runs 
for 20 kilometers.  Although the city of Lódz has 800,000 residents, it is not entirely 
within the Warta basin. 
 
4.2 Principal Water Resource Management Issues 
The largest water resource management challenge in the Warta River basin for quite a 
while has been water quality impairment resulting primarily from human uses.  There are 
also issues of water supply availability and reliability, and of flood control.  These 
management issues are linked closely with water uses, of which the largest categories in 
the basin are industrial (75%), municipal (17%), and agricultural (7%). 
Industrial use is primarily surface water, and agriculture is a combination of 
surface water and groundwater.  Nearly all municipalities in the basin rely on 
groundwater resources for potable uses because it is generally of better quality than 
surface water and requires less treatment prior to use.  Only the cities of Poznań, 
Oborniki, and (for the time being) Łódź use surface water for a significant part of their 
                                                 
4 See map at the beginning of the paper. 
5 Voivodeships are regional levels of governmental administration in Poland, headed by voivodes – state-
governmental bodies.  In relation to self-government functions the same regions are usually called 
provinces.  Regional and local government structure is fairly complicated, and is explained more fully in 
Tonderski and Blomquist (2003). 
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potable use; Łódź is phasing out its reliance on surface water and will soon use only 
groundwater. 
Industry is generally located around the basin’s larger cities, with heavy industry 
concentrated in Poznań, Częstochowa, Ostrów, Gorzów, pharmaceuticals and chemicals 
in Pabianice, Poznań, Gorzów and Inowrocław, and textiles concentrated around Łódź 
and Pabianice.  The timber and pulp industry is predominant around the Noteć River and 
its tributaries, and coal mining has occurred around Konin and Bełchatów.  Farming is 
prevalent in the areas around Sieradz, Kalisz and Poznań.  Food processing plants have 
located in the region as well.  There is a high concentration of fruit processing industry 
around Kalisz and Poznań, grain processing industry around Sieradz, Poznań and 
Kruszwica, and sugar factories throughout Wielkopolska Voivodeship. 
 
4.2.1 Water Quality 
Concentration of industry, agriculture, and urban populations in the Warta Basin has 
contributed to poor surface water quality.  Even in recent years, observers have 
characterized surface water quality of the Warta River itself as “generally poor” 
(Przybylski 1993: 500).   Niemczynowicz (1992: 179) reported that as of 1990 only 8.7 
percent of the Oder River Basin (which for these purposes included the Warta River) met 
Poland’s Category 1 standards,6 suitable for domestic water supply and salmonid fish 
habitat.  Water in another 24.9% of the basin met Category 2 standards (suitable for other 
fish species and for recreational uses), and 24.4% met Category 3 standards (suitable for 
industrial use).  The remaining 43.0% was not suitable for any uses.  The corresponding 
percentages for the Oder River without its tributaries were 0.0% (Category 1), 6.8% 
(Category 2), 28.9% (Category 3), and 64.3% (none), which suggests that tributaries such 
as the Warta are in better condition than the main stem of the Oder, though still not very 
good. 
All of the municipalities contribute sewage waste to the rivers in the basin.  The 
volume of wastewater discharges requiring treatment is about 2,900 Mm3 annually in the 
Warta basin—most of which is municipal wastewater, even though industrial water use 
exceeds municipal, since a large portion of industrial use is for cooling water that does 
not need comparable treatment prior to discharge.  On the other hand, the amount of 
wastewater discharged from municipal and industrial sources fell during the 1990s, partly 
due to reduced water use and partly due to the imposition of fees upon dischargers. 
Łódź contributes the largest total volume of sewage discharge to the river, 
followed by Poznań.  Until 1990, 99.7% of sewage discharged from the Łódź 
metropolitan area was discharged to the Ner river, tributary of the Warta, with no 
biological treatment.  Large cities are not the only problem, however.  As of 2001, 859 
out of 884 Polish towns were sewered, but as many as 66 had no sewage treatment plants, 
so their sewage collections are discharged directly to receiving waters (GUS 2002).  Even 
                                                 
6 Evaluation methods for determining surface water quality in Poland still differ from EU methods, so these 
categories do not correspond precisely with the EU categories of A1, A2, and A3.  Nor does the Polish 
system that is still in use differentiate the quality standards of different water bodies based on their actual or 
intended use.  Waters are simply classified based on their worst-performing pollution indicator.  Thus, 




in the towns that have treatment plants, many are insufficient in terms of capacity and 
level of treatment (particularly with respect to removing biological material). 
Similarly, as of 2001, 1,362 out of 2,547 large industrial sites in Poland have no 
treatment plants, and 108 of the plants in operation have insufficient output.  Another 
crucial water quality problem is contamination from nonpoint sources, which can include 
agricultural as well as industrial pollutants carried from the land surface to receiving 
waters.  Nonpoint pollution is responsible for 60-70% of the country's total nitrogen 
compounds burden (Tonderski, 1997; GUS, 2001a), 40% of organic contaminants (GUS, 
2001a), and 30-40% of phosphorus load (Tonderski, 1997; GUS, 2001a). 
In most cases, groundwater in Poland meets the requirements of European Union 
(EU) and World Health Organization standards. (Blaszczyk 2002)   Nevertheless, 
groundwater is threatened by nonpoint sources such as agricultural runoff and the large 
quantities of industrial pollution discharged to land surfaces as well as to streams and 
lakes.  These discharges seep into the soil, carrying contaminants to the groundwater.  
Such contamination jeopardizes shallow groundwater all over Poland. (Niemczynowicz 
1992: 180) 
 
4.2.2 Water Supply Availability and Reliability 
In terms of water availability per capita, Poland is one of the most nearly water-poor 
European countries, and precipitation and runoff in the Warta River basin are below even 
the national average (Kundzewicz and Chalupka 1994).  The areas with the most frequent 
and largest water shortages are found in the belt of central Poland, including the Warta 
River basin.  Four of the Polish voivodeships with the lowest average runoff per capita 
(in m3/person/year)—Śląskie (~700), Łódzkie (~900), Kujawsko-Pomorskie (~950) and 
Wielkopolskie (~950)—lie partly or entirely in the Warta River basin.  The most difficult 
situations are those of Śląskie, Łódzkie and Wielkopolskie (all of which are partly or 
entirely in the Warta basin), which have almost no transboundary inflows as well as less 
local precipitation and runoff.  Fortunately, central Poland is relatively better off than the 
rest of the country in terms of groundwater resources.  Groundwater resources are least in 
the mountains and foothills of southern Poland, and greater in the central and northern 
plains. 
Average annual precipitation in the Warta basin is about 600 mm.  The basin’s 
total water resources are approximately 6,974 Mm3 per year, of which about 3,753 Mm3 
can actually be used (Kundzewicz and Chalupka 1994), and even less in reliable 
(meaning available 95% or more of the time).  The total water resources translate to a 
little more than 1,000 m3 per person per year, far below the 4,560 m3 per person mean for 
Europe as a whole. 
As in many parts of the world, precipitation and runoff in Poland vary 
substantially from one season to another.  The greatest volumes of surface flow occur in 
late spring (with April the peak month on average), and the smallest in autumn (with 
September the lowest month on average).  Supplies also fluctuate from year to year, with 
mean low flows amounting to only 25% of average flows.  Drought conditions can occur 
in the Warta basin, most recently in 1991-92 when a severe drought caused large losses to 
the economy and ecology of the region.  The winter of 1991-92 was practically without 
snow, followed by a spring and summer of below-normal rainfall.  In June 1992, at the 
worst of the drought, precipitation at Poznań was a mere 3 mm—less than 5 percent of 
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the monthly average of 61 mm.  Crop yields for 1992 fell to just 35 percent of normal, 
and soil erosion accelerated as a result of the amount of bare soil surface in the basin.  
Wildfires plagued the basin to an unprecedented degree, and the public was excluded 
from entering forests throughout the entire Poznań province.  Groundwater levels 
dropped, some smaller streams dried up completely, and all rivers and streams 
diminished sufficiently to cause harm to aquatic and riparian habitat and species 
(Kundzewicz and Chalupka 1994). 
One way to increase the available resources is to store water in reservoirs, which 
has been a significant aspect of Poland’s past approach to water management.  In the 
Warta River basin, the most significant reservoirs in the basin are Jeziorsko, Poraj, 
Pakość, Piaski-Szczygliczki, Gołuchów, Sieradz, and Brzózki.  The two largest reservoirs 
on the main stem of the river are the Poraj and Jeziorsko.  The Poraj reservoir, located 
near the headwaters of the Warta, was built to secure water supply for the Częstochowa 
Steelworks and to provide good conditions for recreation around its shores.  The 
Jeziorsko reservoir, completed in 1986, is located closer to the middle of the main stem 
of the Warta.  It was built chiefly for protecting Konin and Poznań against floods, but 
also provides electricity, some habitat protection,7 and supplemental water for drought 
periods. (Penczak et al. 1998)  With a total volume of 203 million m3 and operational 
volume of 170 million m3, and a reservoir surface area of 42,000 ha, Jeziorsko is the 
principal flood protection structure in the basin. 
 
4.2.3 Flood Control 
Jeziorsko reservoir, with surface area of 42,000 ha, a total volume of 203 million m3 and 
an operational volume of 170 million m3, is also the principal flood protection structure 
in the Warta River basin.  Legendary floods have been experienced in the Warta basin 
from the beginning of the 20th century to the very recent past, most notably 1997.  
Considerable effort in Polish water management generally, and in the Warta basin 
specifically, has been directed toward developing structures to prevent flooding as well as 
store water for droughts.  The floods of July 1997 unveiled many shortcomings and 
defects in the flood protection system throughout the country.  After the flood the Polish 
government adopted a National Program of Reconstruction and Modernization.  Local 
and regional flood protection and prevention plans have been developed, with their 
implementation assisted financially by a central government office created in the 
aftermath of the floods, the Plenipotentiary for Removal of Flood Effects. 
 
4.2.4 Major Stakeholders 
The greatest interests in Warta River basin management are those of municipal water 
suppliers, industries, and agriculture.  Regional governments (the voivodeships), the 
national government, and environmental organizations also have considerable interest in 
a river basin of the Warta’s scale and significance. 
  The interests and activities of local and regional stakeholders within the basin do 
not appear to have driven the creation of the principal organizations for river basin 
management in the Warta basin, however.  The institutions created in the Warta basin 
                                                 
7 In order to secure the habitat for water birds, a stable rising level is maintained in the breeding season 
from April 1st to June 20th. 
 
 11
from 1990 to the present—including the Regional Board of Water Management and then 
Regional Water Management Authority in Poznań (RWMA Poznań)—were created in 
basins throughout Poland at the same time and in largely identical fashion. 
Water quality is primarily a concern for the local governments and utilities 
supplying potable water for domestic use and discharging wastewater (treated or not) to 
the receiving waters in the basin.  As municipalities have switched primarily to 
groundwater, their concern with maintaining its quality (which saves them considerable 
treatment expense) has risen accordingly.  Their concerns with surface water quality 
relate primarily to the stringency (and associated expense) of treatment requirements, but 
also to recreational and aesthetic aspects of the rivers, streams, and lakes in their vicinity. 
The regional and national governments’ concerns with water quality are 
associated with the funding of water quality improvement facilities—national and 
voivodeship funds are the primary source of governmental financial support for improved 
treatment facilities—and with satisfying national and EU water quality standards.  
Ecological and recreational aspects of water use also form a basis for regional and 
national government interest, as well as that of some nongovernmental organizations. 
Water supply availability and reliability are of principal concern to industrial and 
agricultural water users in the basin, since they rely to a greater degree on surface water 
supplies than do municipal suppliers.  Low flows and drought conditions have the 
potential to jeopardize the operation of industrial water intakes and irrigation canals. 
Flood control is primarily of interest in the urban concentrations along the rivers 
in the basin, due to the potential injury and economic losses associated with flooding.  As 
noted already, the national government has taken a particular interest in stimulating better 
flood protection and response at the regional and local level throughout Poland. 
 
5. Institutional Arrangements for Water Management in the Warta River Basin 
An understanding of the institutional arrangements that operate in the Warta River basin 
involves at least three principal elements.  First is the river basin agency for the Warta 
basin, RWMA Poznań.  As noted, introduction of the river basin approach to water 
resources management was a central initiative coming from the national level..  Second is 
the development of integrated water resource management (IWRM) and river basin 
management in Polish water policy and law.  Third is the myriad other national, regional, 
and local governmental bodies with responsibilities for water management in the Warta 
basin and in Poland generally.  Further details concerning the historical development of 
Polish water policy and law, Poland’s governmental structure, and the organizations that 
perform various water management functions in the Warta basin are available in 
Tonderski and Blomquist (2003). 
 
5.1 The Regional Water Management Authority in Poznań (RWMA Poznań) 
During the postwar decades of Soviet dominance, Polish governance and policy 
emphasized central government planning and control.  Water resource planning and 
management exemplified this trend: from 1960 to 1972, a central Institute of Water 
Management was responsible for water planning and use, and analysis of water resource 
information.  A restructuring in 1972-73 yielded a central Ministry of Administration, 
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Country Planning, and Environmental Protection, and an Institute of Meteorology and 
Water Management. 
Throughout this postwar period, water management in the Warta basin and Poland 
generally focused on technical planning and the construction of physical facilities (for 
drainage, retention, flood protection, and navigation) to support industrial and 
agricultural development.  Water resource expenditures were almost exclusively for 
water works and relied heavily on central government plans and funding.  Centrally-
appointed District Directorates of Water Management (DDWMs) were established 
beginning in 1964 to construct and operate water works—first five, then seven, located 
on the principal rivers in Poland, with two DDWMs on portions of the Warta River. 
On the other hand, domestic water supply, sanitation, and wastewater disposal 
were decentralized, local functions with no meaningful planning and management at a 
regional or river basin scale.  The extent and quality of these services was especially 
problematic in rural regions.  By the late 1980s, as the entire governmental system faced 
a period of crisis and transformation, Polish water resource professionals understood the 
need to switch to river basin management, and to broaden the focus of water policy 
toward IWRM—taking into consideration natural and ecological requirements, as well as 
public health and safety and economic development. 
Until 1991, the main governmental entities responsible for water management at 
the sub-national level were not fitted to river basin boundaries.  The DDWMs worked 
along the main stems of some rivers, but not on river basins as a whole.  The other 
regional body was the voivodeship—at that time there were 49 voivodeships in Poland.  
The voivodes governing these provinces were responsible for rivers and streams that 
were not being managed by the DDWMs, for irrigation and drainage, and issuing water 
permits. 
The 1989-91 period of the democratic transformation in Poland was an “open 
policy window” (Kingdon 1995).  Rethinking of governmental structures and procedures 
throughout the country provided the opportunity for an organizational reform such as the 
creation of river basin management authorities.  In February 1991, the Polish government 
announced the creation of a system of Regional Boards of Water Management 
(RBWMs), conforming essentially to river basin boundaries.  Their principal purposes 
were to arrest the further pollution of water supplies, protect drinking water sources, and 
aid water users and water user organizations in developing and implementing rational 
water management.  Their responsibilities concerned the balance of water supplies and 
demands, determining the conditions and terms for the use of basin waters, and 
developing and maintaining a new water information system. 
The RBWMs were related directly to the national government’s Ministry of 
Environment.  Each RBWM director was an individual8 charged by the ministry with 
management of the basin.  There was little provision for public participation or water user 
involvement in RBWM decision making.  Also, the DDWMs were kept in place, 
maintaining their responsibilities for the operation and maintenance of water works on 
their designated river reaches, so in the Warta basin the RBWM covered the entire basin 
while two DDWMs still operated along portions of the river’s main stem. 
                                                 
8 Despite the name Regional Board of Water Management, there really was not a “board.” 
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This structure resulted partly from the fact that the RBWMs’ creation was 
supposed to be accompanied by a thorough revision of Polish water law and policy.  A 
new national water policy was expected to provide a basis for different systems of 
decision making about water resource conditions and efforts to improve them—
essentially, IWRM with a more participatory structure for decision making.  The reforms 
in water law and policy took much longer than expected, however. 
In late 1999, the Minister of Environment decreed a merger of the DDWMs and 
RBWMs and their separate operations into seven Regional Water Management 
Authorities (RWMAs) covering the entire country and corresponding primarily though 
not precisely with Poland’s principal river basins (Figure 1): 
 
Figure 1. RWMA Territories, with Voivodeship Boundaries Shown 
 
1. The RWMA in Katowice covers the Vistula River basin from the Vistula’s 
source to the mouth of the Przemsza River, and the Oder River basin from the 
Polish border to Kędzierzyn-Koźle. 
2. The RWMA in Krakow covers the Vistula River basin from the mouth of the 
Przemsza River to the mouth of the Sanna River.  
3. The RWMA in Warsaw covers the Vistula River basin from the mouth of the 
Sanna River to Korabniki.  
4. The RWMA in Gdansk covers the Vistula River basin from Korabniki to the 
sea and the basins of the east littoral rivers.  
5. The RWMA in Wroclaw covers the Oder River basin from Kędzierzyn-Koźle 
to the mouth of the Nysa Luzycka River.  
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6. The RWMA in Poznań covers the Warta River basin from its source to its 
mouth at the Oder River.  
7. The RWMA in Szczecin covers the Oder River basin from the mouth of the 
Nysa Łużycka River to the mouth at the sea, excluding the Warta. It also 
includes the basin of the west littoral rivers. 
 
On behalf of the central government, RWMAs perform IWRM planning and 
coordinating functions within river basins, overseeing the actions of voivodeship and 
local governments and private users for compatibility with basin water management 
plans, and maintaining specified water works and state-owned reservoirs and other 
facilities.  Tasks related to these functions include: 
 
 monitoring and forecasting surface water and groundwater demand 
conditions, 
 determining the conditions of use of integrated water resources in the basin,  
 acting as a party in legal proceedings in cases regarding the specific use of 
inland waters and in other administrative proceedings pertinent to water 
management and protection,  
 formation of, and communication with, Regional Councils of Water 
Management (RCWMs) composed of representatives of water users and other 
organizations, to have opportunities to comment on water management plans 
and environmental impact assessments, 
 collecting charges and fees for navigation and sluice operation, for materials 
extracted from surface waters, and for leasing of the shore or river bank areas 
and use of facilities, 
 providing opinions on designs and siting of developments that may 
appreciably affect water conditions and facilities located along river banks, 
 cooperating on water management with, among others, the Inspectorates of 
Environmental Protection, the Institute of Meteorology and Water 
Management, maritime offices and regional forestry boards, 
 cooperating on transboundary waters in compliance with the effective legal 
provisions and international agreements, 
 keeping water resource databases (cadasters) and GIS,  
 initiating studies and research on the development and protection of surface 
and underground waters,  
 developing plans and programs for water resources management, water 
protection, and flood and drought prevention, and 
 participating in flood emergency operations. 
 
RWMAs have a legally recognized role in the water use and discharge permitting 
procedures that are carried out by voivodeship or local (poviat or starost) offices.  This 
allows RWMA staff to be aware of activities and investments in environmental protection 
and improvement in the basin, and to object to permit applications that the staff 
concludes will harm basin conditions.  RWMA staff also can identify and try to 
discourage developments that may threaten surface or groundwater quantity or quality.  
The RWMA can also request modification of permits. 
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RWMA Poznań also provides opinions and recommendations to provincial and 
local governments about financing water quality improvement projects, in particular the 
construction of wastewater treatment facilities.  RWMA Poznań has been deeply 
involved in the process of construction of new wastewater treatment plants for the cities 
of Łódź and Poznań, which contribute much of the point-source pollution in the basin. 
The RWMA maintains and operates facilities that regulate river flows for water 
supply and environmental protection, and for the facilitation of navigation.  RWMA 
Poznań owns and operates the regulatory reservoirs in the basin that maintain river flows.  
Reservoir releases are also a means of addressing water shortages.  Voivodeships in the 
basin have the formal authority to declare drought emergencies.  Once an emergency has 
been declared, the RWMA can alter reservoir operations and conditions of water use 
permits in those portions of the basin.  This procedure has not been used yet, and there is 
a reluctance to do so because of its likely impacts on water users. 
With respect to flood control and protection, the RWMA’s function is mainly to 
serve as a coordination and information center, providing decision support for flood 
prevention, flood control, and flood response.  RWMA staff have prepared flood hazard 
maps, planned the construction of additional flood control infrastructure and maintenance 
of existing infrastructure, and supported public information and education.  RWMAs 
make recommendations about emptying reservoirs for flood protection, although those 
recommendations must be approved by the voivodeship director of emergency 
management services.  If the voivodeship director refuses the RWMA’s recommendation, 
the director assumes liability for any flooding that occurs. 
RWMA Poznań receives an annual budget allocation from the central 
government, distributed through the Ministry of Environment.  Some of the RWMA’s 
functions in managing state-owned facilities generate fee revenues, but most of that 
revenue goes directly to the Ministry of Finance.  Overall, 99.5% of the RWMA’s budget 
comes from the central government. 
In addition to its main office (in Poznań), the RWMA has three local offices 
serving basin subareas:  
 
 One in Poznań, addressing the middle and lower Warta River and the Prosna 
River. 
 One in Bydgoszcz, addressing the Notec River. 
 One in Sieradz, addressing the upper Warta River. 
 
All together, RWMA Poznań has 322 employees.  About half (150) are highly 
educated and professional staff (e.g., engineers, attorneys), and the others are technical 
and operations staff. 
 
5.2 Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) and Polish Water Policy 
Revisions to Polish water law, anticipated when the RBWMs were created in 1991, were 
long delayed.  It was not until 1995 that the draft of a new water law was introduced in 
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parliament.  During 1996, it became apparent that objections within parliament were too 
strong to get the proposed new law passed, and in February 1997 it was rejected.9 
The decade-long delay in revising the national water law, from 1991 through 
2001, created some significant problems for the basin management agencies in carrying 
out the range of functions for which they were created.  One was financial: throughout 
the delay, the basin agencies lacked authority to generate their own revenue from fees for 
specific water uses.  Also, the basin agencies were expected to coordinate flood 
protection activities among the municipal (gmina), county (poviat or starost), and 
voivodeship levels.  This was especially difficult while there were so many 
voivodeships—49 nationwide, with 19 in the Warta River basin alone (Kundzewicz and 
Chalupka 1994).  Also, until 1997 the flood protection activities of those other levels of 
government consisted of flood response, not planning and prevention. 
Toward the end of the 1990s, efforts to rationalize management functions and 
shift policy toward IWRM resumed in earnest.  Broader reorganizations of Polish 
government in the late 1990s—including the consolidation of 49 voivodeships into 16—
provided an occasion for reconsidering the distribution of responsibilities for water and 
wastewater, as well as a host of other governmental functions at the subnational level.  
Desires to achieve some economies and end the separate structures of the DDWMs and 
the RBWMs contributed as well.  Poland’s movement toward EU accession (which 
occurred May 1, 2004) also made it necessary to focus on IWRM in order to begin 
aligning Polish policy and practice with EU standards and expectations.  The combined 
result of these forces was a flurry of changes in Polish water policy and institutions 
during 1999-2002. 
After the proposed water law failed to pass in 1997, the Ministry of Environment, 
representatives from the RBWMs, and other interested agencies and groups began 
working on a new proposal.  It was introduced in parliament in 1999, and worked its way 
through parliament’s multi-step approval process during 2000 and early 2001.  Also 
enacted during 2001 were two other laws relating to water resources: the Act on 
Collective Water Supply and Wastewater Discharge Systems, and the Act on 
Environmental Law.  These fit into the most important legal elements of Polish water 
policy, which are: 
 
 the 2001 water law; 
 the 1991 Environmental Inspection Act and the 2001 Environmental Law;  
 the 2001 Act on Collective Water Supply and Wastewater Discharge Systems, 
establishing responsibilities of public water suppliers and wastewater 
dischargers; 
 the 1994 Land Development Act, relating to urban and rural land use 
planning; and 
 the 1990 and 1998 laws establishing the structures and powers of regional and 
local government units (voivodeships, powiats, and gminas).  
 
                                                 
9 While the new law was failing in parliament, the Minister of Environment still wanted to get some 
changes made, and in April 1997 succeeded in getting an amendment (essentially a new chapter) added to 
the old law.  It contained some important provisions, including the requirement that RWMAs be consulted 
by provincial and county governments about the issuance of water use or discharge permits. 
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The 2001 water law, with 220 articles, is quite detailed and specific concerning 
water management generally, and river basin management in particular.  It reformed the 
RWMAs, dissolved the DDWMs, and added a consultative structure for basin 
stakeholders.  Each RWMA must establish a Regional Council of Water Management 
(RCWM), composed of water users and representatives of the other governmental units 
in the river basin.10 
The new water law contains a statement of priorities for the nation as a whole, and 
of priorities among water uses.  Public drinking water is the highest priority use.  The law 
further specifies that groundwater resources should be protected and preserved for public 
drinking water supplies and other uses that require clean water (e.g., certain industries).  
All other consumptive uses (i.e., industrial, urban non-potable, and irrigation) are 
secondary, and their relative priorities depend on basin circumstances.  Water use 
conditions and priorities at the basin scale are to be determined by RWMA directors in 
basin plans that must meet with the RCWM’s approval after wide public consultation. 
The new water law also required the establishment of a National Board of Water 
Management (NBWM), which will be the principal water management entity at the 
national level, displacing that responsibility to some degree from the Minister of 
Environment and the Department of Water Resources within that ministry.  Board 
members will include the RWMA directors, who will no longer relate directly to the 
Ministry of Environment but to the NBWM.  The NBWM, headed by a president, will 
also assume responsibilities such as:  
 
 supervising the activities of the RWMA directors, harmonizing their activities, 
approving their basin plans and progress reports, and recommending 
occasional inspections concerning water management in a region; 
 elaborating plans of water management for the territory of the state (i.e., lands 
beyond the jurisdictional reach of the RWMAs), taking into consideration the 
river basin divisions; 
 drafting flood protection and drought mitigation plans on the territory of the 
state; 
 keeping a water cadastre for the nation, taking into consideration the division 
into the river basin districts; 
 approving projects concerning water use in the river basins; 
 supervising the operation of hydro-meteorological and hydrogeological 
surveys; 
 representing the State Treasury with respect to property related to water 
management and in particular, overseeing the performance of tasks related to 
maintenance of waters or water works; and 
 adjusting, with respect to matters related to water management, draft lists of 
priority projects of the National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water 
Management. 
 
                                                 
10 These councils are to consist of about 30 persons, with half of them being water users.  The others would 
be representatives of various self-governmental/administrative bodies (e.g., provincial and/or local offices) 
and of other organizations.  The regulations for the establishment of these regional advisory councils were 
finalized in December 2002, so they have just been created recently. 
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The president of the NBWM is to be advised by a 30-person National Council of 
Water Management (NCWM), first appointed in June 2002, which represents diverse 
disciplines and constituencies related to water resource management.11  Pursuant to the 
new water law, the NCWM’s activities are to provide advice on the matters of water 
management, flood control and drought control, and in particular to: 
 
 present proposals on improving water resource and flood control conditions 
throughout the country,  
 offer opinions on proposed investment plans and programs for water 
management, and 
 offer recommendations for further legal reforms in relation to water 
management.  
The new water law contains a framework for the division of jurisdiction among a 
number of bodies: 
 the minister competent for maritime management will have jurisdiction with 
respect to territorial and internal sea waters, including the waters of Gdańsk 
Bay; 
 the NBWM President (with cooperation of the RWMAs) will have jurisdiction 
with respect to particular surface and underground waters relevant to flood 
protection and other broad national concerns; 
 the director of a national park will have jurisdiction with respect to waters 
within the borders of the park; 
 the Marshal of a voivodeship acting for the voivodeship authorities will have 
jurisdiction with respect to irrigation and drainage waters for the purpose of 
enhancing productivity, and with respect to other waters as specified. 
 
Water policy in Poland also uses financial instruments to provide incentives for 
water conservation and for water quality protection.  The principal financial instruments 
used currently include:  
 fees for the “use of the environment” (i.e., discharges of wastewater and other 
wastes to receiving waters) by businesses;12 
 fees for withdrawals of surface and underground waters;13 
                                                 
11 The NCWM members are nominated by the national organizations of various self-government entities, 
by academic and other scientific and research entities, and by social, economic, and ecological 
organizations that relate to water management.   Twenty of the 30 persons first appointed to the NCWM 
held the title of Professor or Assistant Professor; 23 were listed as holding doctoral degrees and the other 7 
as holding master’s degrees. 
12 The revenues generated by fees for use of the environment are distributed among the national, 16 
voivode, 373 poviat, and 2,489 municipal funds for environmental protection and water management are 
distributed among the national, 16 voivode, 373 poviat, and 2,489 municipal funds for environmental 
protection and water management and are transferred, respectively, in the proportion of 19.6%, 50.4%, 
10% and 20%.  
 
13 In Poznań city, the fees as of January 2003 were as follows: 0.1242 zl/m3 (~US$ 0.031/m3) for raw 
surface water intake for production (industrial) purposes; 0.392 zl/m3 (~US$ 0.098/m3) for groundwater 
intake for production purposes; surface or groundwater intake for nonproduction purposes, 0.0208 zl/m3 
(~US$ 0.0052/m3).  With the additional costs of treatment and distribution, the water supply charges paid 
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 a “retention fee” related to the reduction of natural water retention caused by 
interfering with natural flows (e.g., as a result of land development, changes in 
land use, etc.); 
 fines for illegal or excessive water withdrawals; 
 fines as for exceeding the limit values specified for waste discharges;14 
 financial assistance in the form of grants and preferential credits from the 
national, provincial, county, and municipal funds for environmental protection 
and water management; 
 financial assistance in the form of grants and preferential credit from the Bank 
for Environmental Protection (Bank Ochrony Srodowiska S.A., or BOŚ) and 
from foundations supporting environmental investments; 
 tax preferences such as opportunities to deduct expenses and donations for 
environmental protection, reduced VAT rates for manufacturers of certain 
goods and those who render ecological protection services, etc. 
 
Although this period of water law and organization reform is only now drawing to 
a close, it is possible to provide a description of the current state of affairs.  As part of 
natural resource and environmental policy generally, water policy is supposed to be based 
on principles of sustainable and rational resource use, with particular reference to:  
 
 the basin principle - water management should be principally organized and 
take place within the designated basin areas; 
 the democratization principle – public involvement and participation in 
decisions regarding the development and use of water resources; 
 the administrative principle - control and supervision of the overall water 
resources; 
 the centralist principle - leaving strategic and fundamental financial means in 
the hands of the central authorities; 
 the market principle - aimed at making water use more economical and 
efficient. 
 
Applying these principles, the main targets of IWRM in Poland are: 
 
 improving the quality of surface and underground waters;  
 assuring water availability for the population and the economy;  
 reducing flood destruction and damage; 
 limiting erosion of river banks and bottoms; 
 safe operation of hydraulic facilities; and 
                                                                                                                                                 
by an average end-user household were 1.9 zl/m3 (US$ 0.475/m3).  The fee paid by end-user households for 
sewage disposal service was 2.42 zl/m3 (US $0.605/m3). 
 
14 Fines e.g. for violating withdrawal or discharge limits or using of the environment (water resources) 
without permit are in spite of funds additionally distributed among Chief Inspectorate of Environmental 
Protection, respectively in the proportion of 19.6%, 36.4%, 10%, 20% and 14% for CIEP. Revenues 
collected by funds are devoted to assisting financially with investments that serve environmental protection 
and water management purposes, e,g, water treatment facilities.   
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 setting conditions for water use for the power industry, navigation, and 
recreation.  
 
National policy also requires that these targets be pursued in harmony with social 
and economic needs as well as with the needs of environmental protection. 
 
5.3 Other Organizations and Management Responsibilities in the Warta Basin 
Despite the nationwide system of RWMAs, water management authority and 
responsibility is far from being integrated at the basin scale.  The RWMAs have 
numerous tasks and responsibilities with respect to water planning and management, 
facilities operation and maintenance, and coordination and consultation with respect to 
water use, water quality, and flood control, but decision making authority and funding for 
several of those tasks have been assigned elsewhere in the Polish governmental system.  
By no means should IWRM in Poland be viewed as centered in the RWMAs. 
An emerging federal system in Poland distributes authority to a number of 
governmental levels and types (Tonderski and Blomquist 2003).  Democratic Poland in 
the 1990s reorganized and strengthened its provincial and local governments, 
decentralizing a number of governmental services and functions, establishing fewer but 
more powerful provincial governments, and resurrecting municipal governments that had 
been all but destroyed during the Soviet era.  That process, which occurred over the same 
period as the establishment of river basin authorities and the reform of Polish water law 
and policy, resulted in the spreading of authority for several aspects of IWRM across a 
number of governments.  National bodies such as the new NBWM influence water policy 
and management as well, and national policy assigns special responsibilities for certain 
water resources to other entities altogether (e.g., in national parks, coastal zones). 
The use of economic instruments for water management was mentioned in the 
previous section.  Fees and penalties are collected from water users and wastewater 
dischargers.  Those revenues are not distributed to or retained by the RWMAs, but are 
apportioned among the national, provincial (voivodeship), county (poviat or starost), and 
municipal levels of government as presented in footnotes 6 and 8 above.  The revenues 
are available for projects to improve environmental conditions, including water resource 
conditions. 
Beginning in 1989, the Polish government established a system of Funds for 
Environmental Protection and Water Management to which the fee and penalty revenue 
is distributed.  The Funds are organized at the national, voivodeship, county (poviat or 
starost), and municipal (gmina) levels.  The Funds have their own governance and 
administration structure and personnel, which do not correspond with or depend on the 
RWMAs.  RWMAs can provide advice about water improvement priorities within their 
respective basins, but the choice of projects to assist is up to the Funds rather than to the 
RWMAs.  A substantial portion of the revenues received by the Funds has been devoted 
to water quality improvement projects, especially treatment plants, but there is no 
institutional arrangement for prioritizing and funding projects at the river basin scale.15 
                                                 
15 Additional sources of funding for environmental improvement projects include: 1) the Bank for 
Environmental Protection (BOŚ), established in 1991, which offers preferential credits for environmental 
protection and water management projects, in cooperation with the National and Provincial Funds for 
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  The other primary element of improving water quality is through the issuance of 
wastewater discharge permits, the placement of conditions on those permits, and 
penalties imposed for unauthorized discharges.  In the Polish system, permits are issued 
by county (poviat or starost) or voivodeship bodies, depending on the size (volume) of 
the permit request and the scope of its potential impacts.  The permit issuing body must 
follow guidelines provided by national law, and are required to consult with the relevant 
RWMA before deciding to grant, conditionally grant, or deny the permit.  Monitoring and 
enforcement of discharge permits and of unauthorized discharges is a responsibility of 
municipal (gmina) or voivodeship officials, not the RWMA.  Water quality at municipal 
water supply intakes is checked by voivodeship Sanitary and Epidemiological Stations. 
  Water quality standards (which, as mentioned, are being revised in conjunction 
with EU accession) have been established by the Ministry of Environment, and under the 
new law will be shifted to the National Board of Water Management and to the RWMA 
directors.  Thus the NBWM and RWMAs will have to establish and revised water quality 
standards, and determine strategies and priorities for improving compliance with them. 
  The primary means of controlling water demand is through the issuance of water 
use permits.16  These permits are issued by county (poviat or starost) or voivodeship 
officials, depending on the size (volume) of the request and the scope of its potential 
impacts.  Under the new water law, RWMAs are required to establish basin plans that 
include water use priorities and conditions in the basin.  The law obliges the counties and 
voivodeships to follow those priorities and conditions when deciding whether to grant, 
conditionally grant, or deny permit applications, and to consult with the RWMA. In the 
case of applications to withdraw groundwater, the new water law adds a requirement that 
counties and voivodeships establish and apply depth limitations for the approval of 
permits.  Monitoring and enforcement of water use permits or unauthorized water uses 
are the responsibility of municipal (gmina) and voivodeship officials, not the RWMAs. 
  Water tariffs are demand management tools that affect water supply availability 
and reliability.  Tariffs are not set by RWMAs but by municipal (gmina) officials—the 
mayor and city council, typically—whether water supply is provided directly by 
municipal government or by a utility or private company under municipal regulation.  In 
rural areas, irrigation systems and drainage systems are regulated by the voivodeship 
administration, with funding support from the central government. 
  Flood control and flood response are municipal and county responsibilities, under 
the supervision of a voivodeship department of emergency management.  The 
voivodeship office may take over flood response if an incident surpasses municipal and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Environmental Protection and Water Management; 2) the Rural Areas Aid Foundation (Fundacja 
Wspomagania Wsi), 3) Polish Agency for Regional Development (Polska Agencja Rozwoju Regionalnego), 
4) European Fund for the Development of Polish Rural Areas (Europejski Fundusz Rozwoju Wsi Polskiej), 
and 5) the Foundation of Aid Programmes for Agriculture (Fundacja Programów Pomocy dla Rolnictwa, 
also known as the Counterpart Fund).  Poland also receives financial aid for water projects under bilateral 
agreements and through international organizations (e.g., International Monetary Fund, the World Bank 
Group, and the EU). 
16 As under the 1974 water law that established the first permit requirement, individual households and 
small farms using 5 m3 or less per day are exempt from needing a water use permit.  The 2001 law 
continues those exemptions but restricts them to water withdrawals for normal domestic and farming uses 
on the property.  The exemption avoids the administrative difficulty and cost of bringing so many small 
users into the permit system. 
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county boundaries.  RWMAs provide information on flood hazards and forecasts, 
maintain and operate reservoir facilities on the rivers, and plan for the construction of 
additional facilities if needed. 
  To summarize, national laws and regulations constitute a framework within which 
basin and sub-basin actors perform their functions, which include: 
 
 RWMA functions, focused mainly on: 
o IWRM planning; 
o Promoting compatibility of other governments’ water management actions 
with basin and national plans and policies through monitoring, or through 
review and comment; and 
o Operational functions concerning reservoirs and other facilities. 
 Voivodeship level functions, particularly 
o Permitting (done by the Environmental Protection and Agriculture 
Departments in 8 voivodeships in the Warta basin); 
o Funding environmental improvement projects (done by the Funds for 
Environmental Protection and Water Management in the 8 voivodeships); 
o Monitoring and enforcement (done by Inspectorates of Environmental 
Protection in the 8 voivodeships); and 
o Management of irrigation facilities and primary drainage systems (done by 
voivodeship Boards of Land Improvement and Water Devices in the 8 
voivodeships). 
 Poviat level functions, particularly 
o Issuing water use and water discharge permits; 
o Monitoring and enforcement (done by environmental protection departments 
of poviat’s offices); 
o Flood protection activities; 
o Fisheries protection; and 
o Funding environmental improvement projects (done by the poviat Funds for 
Environmental Protection and Water Management). 
 Gmina level functions, particularly 
o Water quality enforcement for providers of public water supplies and 
wastewater service; 
o Funding environmental improvement projects (done by gmina Funds for 
Environmental Protection and Water Management);and 
o Monitoring and enforcement (done by gmina environmental protection 
departments). 
 
6. Participants’ Motivations, Incentives, and Actions 
RWMA Poznań would prefer to have both increased funding and increased autonomy, 
but the director is aware that the central government is reluctant to provide both.  Now 
that RWMAs cover the entire country and the old division between the RBWMs and the 
DDWMs has been eliminated, RWMA staff see the RWMA as the logical choice to be 
the principal IWRM entities in Poland, but would be reluctant to accept that greater 
responsibility without additional finances.  Particular frustration accompanies the 
exclusion of the RWMA from a share of the revenues that flow to the Funds for 
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Environmental Protection and Water Management at the national, voivodeship, and local 
levels.  Unless some improved funding base is provided for the RWMAs, the staff will 
continue to have mixed motivations about how vigorously to perform the leadership roles 
that the new water law opens up to them. 
  Central government officials have been trying simultaneously to construct a 
federal democratic republic and implement IWRM at the river basin level, in response to 
signals from supra-national actors.  The effort to pursue both goals simultaneously has 
contributed to geographical and jurisdictional mismatches between the RWMAs and the 
voivodeship and local governments. Central government officials are concerned with 
achieving and maintaining compliance with EU regulations at levels adequate to secure 
continued EU support.  This is one reason for not granting more autonomy to the 
RWMAs and trying instead to make them as nearly identical to one another and as 
closely tied to national policy as possible.  National officials are interested in 
“harmonizing” the RWMAs for the sake of policy consistency but also for the sake of 
administrative convenience.  On another topic, national officials can also be presumed to 
want to avoid the economic losses and the political blame that would results from another 
major flood incident such as 1997. 
The government's determination to enter the EU as soon as possible affects most 
aspects of its economic and environmental policies.  The water sector has been no 
exception in this regard.  National water law and policy has largely been reconciled with 
the EU Directive as a result of the 2001 legislation (Blaszczyk 2002).  What remains to 
be done over the next few years is to conform the details of regulations, and the actual 
practices of water suppliers, wastewater dischargers, and public agencies involved with 
management of water resources, to the Directive’s requirements.  “Special plans for the 
implementation of the directives concerning urban wastewater treatment and hazardous 
substances have been prepared.  Legal acts impose certain obligations onto the 
‘dischargers’ of wastewater regarding modernisation, modification, construction or 
reconstruction of treatment facilities, and in the case if industry—compliance of 
technology with present requirements (BAT).” (Blaszczyk 2002) 
Because EU accession is a national government responsibility, government 
offices at the subnational level will also have a role in that process.  For example, the 
Department of Environmental Protection and Agriculture of Wielkopolskie Voivodeship 
is developing a program for sewage treatment facilities—which is in large measure a 
compilation of local government plans for treatment facilities—and this program along 
with the programs of the other 15 voivodeships will comprise much of the Polish national 
response to EU rules concerning wastewater treatment. 
  Voivodeship regulators are concerned with maintaining compliance with national 
regulations at levels adequate to secure continued funding.  Keeping authority over 
permit issuance, environmental enforcement, and the financing of environmental 
improvement projects are all means to that end.  Ceding or sharing control of these 
functions with RWMAs is not a desirable alternative from the perspective of voivodeship 
officials.  It must also be remembered that the issue of jurisdictional and geographical 
mismatches cuts both directions: just as it may be frustrating to an RWMA to deal with 
multiple voivodeships, there are voivodeships in Poland (such as Lodz) which must deal 
with more than one RWMA.  Voivodeship officials can also be presumed to want to 
avoid the economic losses and the political blame that would accompany a reoccurrence 
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of a major flood event such as 1997, and thus to support investments in flood control 
projects. 
  Provincial and local officials face incentives to grant water use permit 
applications that will facilitate economic growth, as Poland continues to recover from 
decades of relative economic stagnation and tries in the future to catch up to its EU 
counterparts.  This creates some difficulty in arresting the growth of groundwater use in 
urban and industrial areas already experiencing declining groundwater levels.  On the 
other hand, the fee structure (which directs a portion of environmental penalty collections 
back to the local governments) provides a mild incentive to monitor and enforce 
environmental compliance. 
  Agricultural water users want to maintain access to cheap, plentiful water with 
minimal regulation of use.  Keeping the exemption for on-farm water use and water 
discharge is a logical course of action consistent with that motivation.   Industrial water 
users also can be presumed to want cheap, plentiful water, with minimal regulation and 
maximum subsidization of waste disposal.  Discharge fees are more acceptable to this 
sector if the revenue supports projects such as treatment plants that help maintain surface 
water quality and avoid further restrictions on industrial discharges. 
  Municipal water suppliers have focused on source water quality protection and 
improvement, which help minimize treatment costs and rate pressures.  Of course, rate 
pressures can also be lessened by subsidization of treatment plants.  The latter can be 
obtained from the Funds for Environmental Protection and Water Management, primarily 
at the voivodeship level.  Water suppliers operating as enterprise utilities (e.g., Poznań) 
also have an interest in seeing tougher regulations on rural and other suppliers, so the 
full-cost recovery rates of urban utilities do not diverge too radically from the costs of 
water provided by other nearby suppliers. 
  Environmental interests have seized the democratization process in Poland since 
1990s to pursue opportunities for representation in a water policy sector that was largely 
closed to them before.  The creation of an NCWM and the RCWMs with a prescribed 
distribution of seats provides such opportunities.  EU accession, which brings a layer of 
supranational environmental regulation to bear upon Polish governments, also serves the 
interests of environmental organizations in Poland. 
 
7. Performance Assessment 
7.1 Water Quality 
Water quality remains a great challenge in the Warta basin, and the results of efforts to 
improve it are mixed.  Rivers remain polluted with bacteriological and chemical 
contaminants.  Direct water quality measures include concentrations of contaminants.  
Indirect water quality measures include indicators such as fish population, size, and 
species variety.  By both kinds of measures, water quality in the Warta basin has 
improved with respect to some indicators, and worsened in other places or with respect to 
other indicators. 
Waterborne diseases have not been considered a significant issue in Poland for 
decades.  Generally, water supply facilities have provided waters of good hygienic 
quality.  Much effort toward water quality improvement has focused instead on reducing 
untreated wastewater discharges from urban areas. 
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Water quality improvements are not lagging for lack of effort or expenditure.17  
Recent investments have stimulated the development of additional sewage treatment 
plant capacity.  The wastewater treatment plant for the Łódź metropolitan area, 
completed at the end of 2001, is the biggest treatment facility in Poland (average 
incoming inflow during dry weather 192,000 m3/day and during rainy weather 644,000 
m3/day).  This plant now serves 750,000 people, and its advanced technology meets 
Polish and European standards.  The second large wastewater treatment plant, serving 
Poznań (150,000 m3/day), has been equipped with the same advanced technology. 
Most municipalities in Wielkepolskie voivodeship now have sewage collection 
systems.  The countryside lags far behind, though.  EU funds for rural development have 
been and will be helpful in improving the quality of water discharged in rural areas. 
Industrial and other discharges continue to take their toll on water quality, 
however.  The poorest water quality is generally found in the portion of the river from 
just above Jeziorsko reservoir downstream to the Prosna River.  The stretch of the Warta 
between the Ner mouth and the Prosna mouth is among the river’s most polluted 
portions.  Inflow from the Prosna River, farther down the Warta stem, reduces the 
pollution concentrations in the Warta from that point to its junction with the Oder.  
Downstream of the Warta inflow, levels of cadmium and nutrients in the sediments of the 
Oder increase, reflecting agricultural and industrial (especially electronics 
manufacturing) activities upstream in the Warta. (Muller et al. 2002: 244)  The cadmium 
increase is from 9 mg/kg upstream of the Warta mouth to 16 mg/kg downstream. (Muller 
et al. 2002: 249)  On the other hand, the concentrations of arsenic, copper, and mercury in 
the Oder sediments decline below the mouth of the Oder, so “the Warta sediments are 
less contaminated with these metals than Odra sediments sampled upstream.” (Muller et 
al. 2002: 249) 
As for organic contaminants (e.g., DDT, PCB, PAHs) the Oder downstream of the 
Warta showed decreases, again indicating that concentrations of these contaminants were 
lower in the Warta than in the rest of the Oder river basin. (Muller et al. 2002: 250)  Total 
organic carbon (TOC), composed of dissolved organic carbon (DOC) and particulate 
organic carbon (POC), in the Warta is slightly lower than in the Oder and Vistula, 
according to sampling performed in 1995.  Organic contaminant concentrations peak in 
the Warta in August (toward the end of the dry season, when river flows are diminished) 
and trough in December, according to sampling performed in 1994 by the Institute of 
Meteorology and Water Management. (Siepak 1999: 284) 
TOC concentrations in all three major Polish rivers were much higher than the 
Rhine or Rhone rivers elsewhere in Europe, or the Mississippi or Yukon rivers in North 
America (Siepak 1999: 284), and were higher in 1994 and 1995 than in 1991.  Siepak 
(1999: 284) attributes the increased TOC to “the pollution by industrial and municipal 
wastes caused by a lack of biological purification plants for large cities on the rivers.”  
The newly completed wastewater treatment plants for Łódź and Poznań should improve 
this situation. 
                                                 
17 This is true of environmental protection generally, and on a nationwide scale.  Investment outlays for 
environmental protection in Poland have increased almost fivefold since 1990, although Poland has reached 
only about half the level of West European countries.  Appreciable progress is also observed in 
appropriations for environmental protection as a share of national economy investment outlays (from 3.6% 
in 1990 to 8.0% in 1999) or of the Gross Domestic Product (in 1998 it reached 1.6%). 
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  Ten years of data on the presence of surfactants (compounds used in cleaning 
products such as laundry soap) in the Warta at Poznań found declines in anionic 
surfactants but a substantial (six-fold) increase in nonanionic surfactants during the 
1990s.  Some of this change reflected the changing ratio of these compounds in cleaning 
products themselves, but that alone would not account for the size of the increase in 
nonanionic surfactants.  Data from measuring stations at other points along the river 
indicated that concentrations of nonanionic surfactants were highest downstream of the 
industrial cities of Czestochowa, Sieradz, and Gorzow.  High concentrations were also 
found on the Ner river downstream of Łódź, where the anionic surfactant concentrations 
“were more similar to those of a raw sewage than surface water.” (Szymanski et al. 2001: 
375) 
Fish populations, species diversity, and size and weight provide indirect indicators 
of water quality improvement or decline.  For the most part, data on fish in the Warta 
River indicate that water quality still needs considerable improvement.  In the farthest 
upper reaches of the Warta river, where water quality is significantly impaired by mining 
and other industrial discharges, no fish are found. (Przybylski 1996: 40)  The next river 
portion—the stretch of the upper Warta between the Poraj and the Jeziorsko reservoirs, 
along which the riverbed and banks are natural—exhibits eutrophication problems but the 
highest fish population, growth rates, sizes, and species diversity. (Przybylski 1996; 
Penczak et al. 1998) 
Both species richness and species diversity in the Warta drop dramatically along 
the stretch of the Warta from the Ner mouth to the Prosna mouth. (Przybylski 1993: 508)  
“Drastic changes in the fish fauna composition were noted in the polluted parts of the 
upper Warta, especially in the part above the inflow of the Ner River (pollution from the 
city of Łódź, via the Ner).  In this part of the river, the species number is reduced to a 
minimum value of four.” (Przybylski 1993: 506) 
Along the middle of the Warta’s course, a large and statistically significant drop 
in species richness and diversity occurs between the river stretches above and below the 
Jeziorsko reservoir.  The number of species and their population and size were recorded 
at selected sites above and below the dam over an 11-year study period, 1985 (the year 
before the dam was built) through 1995 (Penczak et al. 1998; Penczak 1999; Glowacki 
and Penczak 2000).  In the 10 years after the river was impounded, the number of fish 
species found below the dam decreased two- to three-fold while the number in the natural 
river course above the dam remained relatively constant.18  Even after 10 years, the size 
and weight of fish did not recover to pre-impoundment levels upstream or downstream of 
the dam (Penczak 1999). 
The Jeziorsko dam has no fish ladder, which obviously accounts for some of the 
negative impact on fish population.  Two migratory species found in the river before the 
dam’s construction became extinct thereafter (Penczak et al. 1998: 168).  Even non-
migratory fish below the dam are fewer in number and species diversity, and smaller in 
size.  Some effects on non-migratory fish may be due to impacts on water temperature 
from the hydroelectric power plant at the dam—since the dam was completed, there has 
                                                 
18 There was a sharp but temporary drop in fish population and species diversity above the dam in March 
1989, when the trees and other vegetation along the riverbank were cleared.  The population rebounded 
over the next three years as the vegetation grew back. (Penczak 1995a) 
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been no ice cover on the river for five kilometers downstream.  The water released below 
the dam has also exhibited greater and rising alkalinity, and lower oxygen levels, 
compared with the water upstream. (Penczak et al. 1998: 162)  In addition to stressing the 
fish population directly, these changes also affect their food supply. (Penczak 1995a: 57) 
The opening and closing of the dam sluices appears to have the greatest effect on 
fish population, size, and species diversity, because of their effects on downstream 
aquatic and riparian habitat.  Closing the sluices causes portions of the riverbed to be 
exposed for long periods, and when the sluices are reopened large pulses of water surge 
down the river course.  Other pulses occur as a result of operation of the hydroelectric 
plant at the dam. (Penczak et al. 1998: 169)  If the trend in fish species below the dam 
continues, soon “there will be no fish in the tailwater at all,’ and this phenomenon may 
continue for many kilometers downstream. (Glowacki and Penczak 2000: 106)  Barbel 
and nase are already extinct below the dam, and chub, dace, and gudgeon are in danger of 
extinction. (Penczak and Kruk 2000) 
 
7.2 Water Supply Availability and Reliability 
A top priority in the Warta basin is the development of additional small retention 
facilities (small and medium-sized reservoirs) for irrigation supplies, flood protection, 
and electricity.  At the request of RWMA Poznań, the Institute for Meteorology and 
Water Management completed a study titled, The Hierarchy of Needs in the Small 
Retention Areas.  According to this study, Wielkopolskie province in the center of the 
Warta River basin falls into the category of extreme needs.  There are areas within the 
basin that have been in drought conditions up to 10 times over the past 30 years, and 
RWMA Poznań has also been targeting those areas for small reservoir improvements.  
The principal barrier to construction of needed facilities has been lack of funding.  There 
was a national policy to promote water storage facilities such as small reservoirs, but 
funding has not been adequate to carry it out and the RWMA does not have funds of its 
own to devote to this purpose. 
Installation of water meters, imposition of water tariffs, and updating the water 
use permit system hold the greatest promise for improving water supply reliability by 
managing the growth of water demands.  RWMA Poznań started promoting water meters 
in the early 1990s.  Meters had such a dramatic downward impact on water consumption 
that some urban water suppliers complained of the loss of sales.  Compliance with the EU 
Water Framework Directive will require full-cost pricing, which may reduce 
consumption even further. 
Although tariffs are a useful tool for restraining the growth of water demand, 
there is one difficulty with the current system of water use permits and water use tariffs in 
the Warta basin.  Tariffs on permit holders are based on actual water use, not on the 
amount of the permit, so users tend to apply for larger permits than they will really need 
(since they will be charged only for what they actually use).  Water resources in the basin 
therefore appear to be “over-appropriated” in places where they may not be.  Water 
permits in the Prosna sub-basin, for example, already exceed available flow.  The poviat 
decision makers have allowed additional permits in that sub-basin because they know that 
the permitted amounts do not reflect actual use.  One suggestion to rationalize this system 
has been to base fees on permit amounts rather than actual use, but this would reduce the 
sensitivity of actual use to fee changes. 
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In urban and industrialized areas of the basin, economic growth has combined 
with greater reliance on groundwater to contribute to localized concerns about 
groundwater supplies.  Declining groundwater levels are now evident in parts of the 
Warta basin near Poznań.  It is not certain whether a sustained overdraft condition exists 
at present, but applications for new water uses in the Poznań poviat are being reviewed 
more carefully, and some have been denied. 
In the rapidly growing municipality of Tarnowo Podgorne, just north of Poznań 
and near the middle reach of the Warta, groundwater levels have not shown a general 
areawide decline, but some individual wells have experienced diminished production.  
The municipal water system has recently connected with the Poznań water utility for 
backup supply, which is sometimes needed in the summer.  Their contract with the 
Poznań utility sets a minimum amount that Tarnowo Podgorne will purchase whether 
they need it or not (a “take-or-pay” contract) and a maximum amount they can purchase.  
Tarnowo Podgorne has also reserved a new water intake in a neighboring community, 
which they can install and use if needed. 
During drought conditions in the early 1990s, some permit holders in the Warta 
basin were unable to get their full entitlements.  Some small restrictions were placed on 
water use then, with some irrigation and non-potable urban uses cut back in order to 
protect higher-priority potable and industrial water uses.  At that time, voivideship 
officials decided on water restrictions.  Under the new law, the RWMA director would 
make those decisions, and RWMA Poznań must develop plans for water restrictions 
during drought.  A step in this direction is the development of a dynamic modeling 
process for assigning priorities among classes of water, tied to their respective 
vulnerabilities during a drought or other emergencies.  This has been developed initially 
in the Prosna River sub-basin because data are available to support this kind of modeling. 
 
7.3 Flood Control 
Severe flooding occurred in the Warta basin as throughout Poland in 1997, and the risk of 
flooding has certainly not been eliminated.  The central role in the basin’s flood 
protection system is played by Jeziorsko reservoir, on the border between Lódz and 
Wielkopolskie voivodeships and completed in 1986.  From November until March the 
reservoir is normally prepared to receive a flood wave of 203 Mm3.  The Jeziorsko 
reservoir, in connection with natural flooding capacity of the Koninsko-Pyzderskiej 
valley and the valley upstream of Poznań in the Rogalin area, provides good flood 
protection for Poznań, the basin’s largest city.   
Within its own catchment, the Noteć does not present significant flooding risks. 
This is mainly due to the area’s land use, which is dominated by low-intensive pastures 
and meadows.  However, below the Notec’s confluence with the Warta, the city of 
Gorzów, about 200 km downstream of Poznań, is much more exposed to flood risks.  
This city is subject to water flow from the Noteć River as well as backwater from the 
Oder River. The city’s only protection is provided by embankments that are in poor 
condition. 
 The Prosna River remains unpredictable, with a large flood potential that 
threatens another large city in the basin, Kalisz.  Significant improvement of the situation 
will be achieved when a reservoir planned for Wielowieś Klasztorna, with about 50-70 
Mm3 capacity is built.  RWMA Poznań advocates construction of this reservoir on the 
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Prosna River above Kalisz to provide control of a high water wave in order to avoid the 
superposition of waves from the Warta and the Prosna Rivers, thus reducing the flood 
hazard to Poznań as well as Kalisz. 
 
8. Applying the Analytical Framework 
8.1 Initial Conditions and Contextual Factors 
The Warta basin does not feature significant cultural, religious, ethnic or other divisions 
within the population that hinder the prospects for successful river basin management.  
Similarly, asymmetries in the distribution of resources among basin stakeholders do not 
appear to have impeded the move toward the adoption of IWRM at the basin scale. 
  Economic development of the basin and the country have had effects, however.  
Poland’s agricultural and industrial sectors emerged from the era of Soviet domination 
lagging behind the West.  Support from international financial institutions and from the 
EU aided Poland’s economic and political transition, and also provided incentives for 
reforms such as IWRM and the creation of river basin agencies.  Still, Poland’s economic 
conditions have led to financial constraints on the government sector, limiting its ability 
to provide either central funding or revenue autonomy adequate to the tasks of IWRM at 
the basin scale. 
 
8.2 Characteristics of the Decentralization Process 
The main point about the decentralization process has been made already in this paper: 
the decentralization of government in Poland, and the reform of water policy and water 
organizations, were attempted over the same (and relatively short) period of time, and the 
results of those simultaneous processes have not always been smooth.  Significant 
responsibilities for water resource planning and management have been spread across 
basin and sub-basin agencies, and water law reform took several years longer than 
originally envisioned. 
There appears to be no question, however, of the central government’s 
commitment to decentralization and democratization reforms, or about its recognition of 
the local and basin-scale organizations that it created.  Central government officials have 
maintained that commitment throughout the post-Soviet period.  However, as noted 
above, they have held the pursue strings rather tightly in light of the limited financial 
resources available to the public sector in Poland. 
 
8.3 Central-Local Relationships and Capacities 
Overall, the water law changes in 1997 and 2001, and the merger with the DDWMs in 
1999, have given the RWMAs more responsibilities but not additional sources of 
revenue.  According to the RWMA director in Poznań and others, the RWMAs have not 
fared well in the national government’s budgetary process.  RWMA Poznań had a 2002 
budget of $1.8 million, quite small for an organization covering such a large basin and 
employing so many individuals.   Of this allocation, 73.8% is used for investments end 
planning in the basin, 5.9% for other development activities, 2.2% for water quality 
activities, 0.1% for operations and maintenance, and 18% for administration and other 
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categories.  The small amount of financing has left the RWMAs unable to address the 
wide array of management concerns within the basin, or even to adequately fund 
maintenance of water works within the basin.  The budgetary needs for maintenance and 
upgrading of facilities mount each year, and the backlog of needed (but unfunded) tasks 
accumulates.    The RWMA Poznań estimates that fulfilling all of its responsibilities 
would cost about 100 million zlotys per year.  It receives a budget of about 5 million 
zlotys per year.  So the RWMA is unable to do everything it is supposed to do. 
  Still, it is important to reiterate here how quickly the institutional reforms have 
transpired.  It can be argued strongly that with major reforms occurring in 1990, 1992, 
1997, 1999, and 2002, there has not been enough time for the full implementation of 
basin management activities, or for a thorough assessment of their performance. 
  It should also be noted that the water rights system established in Poland (portions 
of which pre-date the democratic transformation) is in certain respects conducive to 
IWRM, and the reforms since 1990s have attempted to add a basin-wide perspective to 
that system.  Permits for water use and water discharge are limited in time and quantity, 
and approved only after consultation about basin conditions.  Fees associated with non-
permitted actions or with permit violations provide incentives to users and also a revenue 
source for environmental improvement projects.  Other reforms (such as transferability of 
permits) have yet to be undertaken, but most elements of the institutional infrastructure of 
a water rights system compatible with IWRM are in place. 
 
8.4 Internal Basin-Level Institutional Arrangements 
There are basin-level institutions in Poland, but as emphasized throughout this paper, 
those institutions are neither the beginning nor the end of the story.  Management of the 
Warta River basin is substantially dispersed, polycentric, and federated.  Its federated 
nature is seen by this comparison, provided by the RWMA Poznań director, of the 
distribution of water management responsibilities before and after the 1989-1991 period 
of initial decentralization reform that shifted Polish water management toward a river 
basin focus.  Before creation of the RBWMs, water administration was 100% national, 
now is 65% municipal and county, 30% basin, 4% voivode, and 1% national.  Before 
creation of the RBWMs, infrastructure financing was 100% national, now is 50% 
municipal and county, 30% voivodeship, and 20% national.  Before creation of the 
RBWMs, water quality enforcement was 100% national, now is 60% municipal and 
county, 30% voivodeship, and 10% national.  Before the reorganization, voivodes were 
100% responsible for issuing water and wastewater permits; now this is done by poviat or 
voivodeship officials with the advice and consent of RWMAs. 
This federal approach, with a sharing of responsibilities across levels and units of 
government, allows for the recognition of sub-basin communities of interest, and 
provides overlapping layers of monitoring and enforcement of water management 
regulations.  It does not, however, lend itself to clarity of institutional boundaries or a 
close matching of jurisdictional boundaries to basin boundaries.  The Warta case provides 
a clear reminder that jurisdictional boundary issues will arise within any river basin 
unless all water-related responsibilities are concentrated in the basin management agency, 
which is probably infeasible politically if not administratively.  This is evident in the 
situation of Łódź voivodeship, which is intersected by and divided among two river basin 
authorities.  It is also evident in the fact that the RWMA in Poznań has to interact with 
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several voivodeships that lie partly within and partly outside the Warta River basin. 
These interactions do not yet operate seamlessly, and require all of the actors to 
understand well their new roles. 
  Forums for information and communication sharing, and for conflict resolution, 
are essential in such a polycentric setting.  The RCWMs and NCWM appear to be 
intended to aid in the information sharing and communication roles, but they are so new 
that there is no record from which to judge their operation at this time.  Nor can the 
effectiveness of conflict resolution methods (which rely strongly on negotiations between 
governmental units) be assessed conclusively yet. 
 
9. Conclusions 
The Warta basin case illustrates how much institutional creation and policy reform can be 
accomplished in a relatively short period when a central government makes and sustains 
a commitment to decentralization and to IWRM.  Fifteen years ago, Poland did not have 
a rational system of water tariffs, wastewater discharge controls, or water resource 
planning, let alone a set of river basin-scale organizations for water management.  Now 
all of these are in place, albeit still quite new, along with bodies at the national, provincial 
and local levels for funding water quality improvements and other environmental 
protection projects. 
The Warta basin case also illustrates, however, the gaps that can emerge between 
river basin management organizations on the one hand and a policy of IWRM on the 
other.  In the period 1989-2001, the central government in Poland attempted to revise and 
reform the entire structure of general-purpose governments at the provincial and local 
levels, to decentralize several state functions to those levels, to create and then reorganize 
its system of river basin management agencies, and reform its policy approach to water 
resource management.  While much has been accomplished, institutional boundaries have 
not always been clear, and some things have proceeded quite out of phase—principally, 
the establishment of the river basin agencies without a revenue source of their own, 
without a structure for basin stakeholder representation and participation, and a decade 
before the passage of the water law that largely defines and authorizes their activities. 
Polish water policy has indeed embraced and moved toward IWRM, but the 
decentralization has spread water management responsibilities and authority across a 
large number of sub-basin entities.  Organizational responsibilities and relationships 
appear to be substantially less integrated than policy.  There are requirements for 
consultation of the RWMAs and conformity to basin plans, but until 2002 (with the 
creation of the RCWMs) there was no formal structure to integrate the general-purpose 
governments at the voivodeship and local levels into the RWMAs or vice versa.  
Currently there is a substantial gap between the basin-scale organizations that have been 
created in Poland and the activities that comprise IWRM, most of which have been 
assigned to sub-basin governments.19   
                                                 
19 Consider, for example, the contrast between the river basin authorities in Poland and those in Spain, such 
as the one for the Guadalquivir river basin that is another case study in this research project.  The 
Guadalquivir basin authority has substantially more management responsibility than RWMA Poznań, and 
is closer to an IWRM agency.  It does permitting, monitoring of water use, monitoring of water quality—
functions that in the Polish case continue to be spread among agencies and levels of government. 
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The Warta case serves as a reminder that IWRM (a policy approach) is one thing, 
and coordination at the river basin scale (an organizational approach) is another.  One can 
be created and not the other, and it is possible for both to be attempted without being 
matched to one another.  Harmonization of water resource management functions thus 
remains an unfinished agenda item for the Polish water sector as a whole and in the 





English Explanation in English 
Abbreviation 
in Polish Explanation in Polish 
BWM Bureau of Water 
Management 
BGW Biuro Gospodarki Wodnej 
CIEP Chief Inspectorate of 
Environmental Protection 
GIOŚ Główny Inspektorat Ochrony 
Środowiska 
DDWM District Directorate of Water 
Management 
ODGW Okręgowa Dyrekcja Gospodarki 
Wodnej 
IMWM Institute of Meteorology and 
Water Management  
IMGW Instytut Meteorologii i 
Gospodarki Wodnej 
Mm3 Million cubic meters   
NBWM National Board of Water 
Management  
KZGW Krajowy Zarząd Gospodarki 
Wodnej 
NCWM National Council of Water 
Management  
KRGW Krajowa Rada Gospodarki 
Wodnej 
NFEPWM National Fund for 
Environmental Protection & 
Water Management 
NFOŚGW Narodowy Fundusz Ochrony 
Środowiska i Gospodarki 
Wodnej 
RBWM Regional Board of Water 
Management 
RZGW Regionalny Zarzad Gospodarki 
Wodnej (stary) 
RWMA Regional Water Management 
Authority 
RZGW Regionalny Zarzad Gospodarki 
Wodnej (nowy) 
RCWM Regional Council of Water 
Management 
RGWRW Rada Gospodarki Wodnej 
Regionu Wodnego 
VFEPWM Voivodeship Fund for 
Environmental Protection & 
Water Management 
WFOŚGW Wojewódzki Fundusz Ochrony 
Środowiska i Gospodarki 
Wodnej 
VIEP Voivodeship Inspectorate of 
Environmental Protection 
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Appendix: Variables in the Analytical Framework 
As noted in Section 2, the analytical framework used for this research project entails 
several variables hypothesized to be related to the success or failure of river basin 
management institutions, grouped into four categories. 
 
Contextual factors and initial conditions 
The literature on decentralized water resource management indicates that successful 
decentralization is at least partly a function of the initial conditions that prevail at the 
time a decentralization initiative is attempted.  These initial conditions are elements of the 
social context of the decentralization effort.  They include 
 
o Economic development of the nation; 
o Economic development of the basin area; 
o Initial distribution of resources among basin stakeholders; and 
o Class, religious, or other social/cultural distinctions among basin stakeholders. 
 
Characteristics of the decentralization process 
In countries that have attempted to decentralize water resource management to the basin 
level, characteristics of the decentralization process itself will affect the prospects for 
successful implementation.  Two necessary conditions of a decentralization initiative are 
(a) devolution of authority and responsibility from the center, and (b) acceptance of that 
authority and responsibility by the local or regional units.  Whether (a) and (b) occur will 
depend in part upon why and how the decentralization takes place.  Important factors 
include 
 
o Whether basin-level management was a local initiative to assume management 
responsibilities, a devolution that was mutually desired by local stakeholders and 
central government officials, or a decision by central government officials to shed 
water resource management responsibilities regardless of whether basin 
stakeholders wanted to assume them; 
o The extent of central-government recognition of local-level basin governance; 
and, 
o Whether central government officials maintained a policy commitment to 
decentralization and basin management through transitions in central government 
administration.\ 
 
Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
Because successful decentralization requires complementary actions at the central 
government and local levels, other aspects of the central-local relationship can be 
expected to condition that success.  Political and institutional variables should be 
explored that relate to the respective capacities of the central government and the basin-
level stakeholders, and the relationship between them.  Key factors include 
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o The extent to which devolution of water management responsibilities from central 
government to basin institutions has been real or merely rhetorical, and whether 
devolution has been handled as a supportive transition to basin management or as 
an abrupt abandonment of central government authority; 
o The financial resources available to basin-level institutions, and the extent of their 
financial autonomy; 
o Basin management participants’ ability to create and modify institutional 
arrangements that are tailored to their needs and circumstances; 
o The extent of other experience at the local or regional level within the country 
with self-governance and service provision; 
o The distribution (particularly asymmetries) of national-level political influence 
among basin stakeholders; 
o Characteristics of the water rights system in the country which facilitate or hinder 
basin management efforts; and 
o Whether basin-level institutions have had adequate time for implementation and 
adaptation of basin management activities. 
 
The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements 
Successful implementation of decentralized water resource management will also depend 
on features of the basin-level arrangements created by stakeholders and/or central 
government officials.  Important ones include 
 
o The presence of basin-level governance institutions; 
o The extent of clarity of institutional boundaries, and their match with basin 
boundaries; 
o Whether and to what extent basin-level institutional arrangements recognize sub-
watershed communities of interest; 
o The availability of forums for information sharing and communication among 
basin stakeholders; 
o The ability to make, monitor, and enforce contingent contracts whereby basin 
stakeholders can agree to contribute to improvements in basin conditions; 
o The institutionalization of regular monitoring of basin conditions by means that 
are trusted by water users; and 
o The availability of forums for conflict resolution. 
 
Certainly, these factors will not all apply with equal significance in all cases.  In 
each case, the emergence and path of river basin management will be affected profoundly 
by some of these variables, affected slightly by others, and not at all by some.  
Institutional analysis in a case-study setting consists largely in determining which 
institutional factors in what combination appear to have been linked to outcomes.  
Furthermore, many of the variables listed above have subjective components, and will be 
assessed differently by different participants and observers.  It is therefore essential in 
these case studies that team members interview individuals with a variety of perspectives. 
 
 
